This paper develops a theory of strategic outsourcing that arises due to trade liberalization. 
Conclusion

Non-Technical Summary
One of the most significant effects of trade liberalization on patterns of production and trade during the last decade is the phenomenon of international `outsourcing' and/or `fragmentation'. Although it is hard to clearly distinguish these two terminologies, `fragmentation' often describes the break-up of a production process, while `outsourcing' describes a firm's decision about its production structure. International outsourcing and fragmentation have been well documented and their effects on production and input markets are the subject of many recent empirical studies.
They are often seen as ways for firms to look for cheaper suppliers (especially from lower wage countries) to cope with increasing international competition. The theories developed in this area are broadly based on two approaches.
The first approach, which is adopted in most studies in the literature, focuses on competitive market structure, especially regarding the intermediate product market [e.g., Jones (2000) , Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) ]. The second approach, which has its origin in the industrial organization literature, focuses on a firm's vertical structure [e.g., McLaren (2000) ]. Under these theories the effects of outsourcing are pro-competitive and economically efficient, in the sense that they result in lower prices for both intermediate and final products.
In this paper, we consider an unnoticed feature of outsourcing, namely, that outsourcing firms sometimes purchase intermediate products from more efficient suppliers that are also their rivals in markets for final products.
International outsoucing of this nature is common in many industries, such as the computer industry and the automobile industry (see discussion later). We argue that in this case the usual cost-saving motive for outsourcing could be accompanied by a strategic motive, and that the strategic outsourcing in response to trade liberalization in intermediate goods can have anti-competitive effects, resulting in higher prices for both intermediate and final goods. Our basic insight is that outsourcing enables competitors to form customer-supplier relationships, which can have a collusive effect on competition. Trade liberation could therefore have an ambiguous effect on consumer prices, depending on the relative tariff reductions for intermediate and final goods. We consider a model where two firms, one domestic and one foreign, produce a differentiated product using a homogenous intermediate input and compete only in the domestic market. The foreign firm has the lower (marginal) cost, mF, in producing the intermediate input and thus always stays integrated. The domestic firm, however, can either produce the intermediate input itself (or purchase it from a competitive domestic supplier) at higher cost, mD (mD>mF), or purchase the intermediate input from the integrated foreign firm. Recognizing that these two firms may compete in the final product market, we allow the domestic firm to behave strategically in choosing its input suppliers. In a two-stage game where the choice of the supplier of intermediate inputs is determined in the first stage and then the two firms engage in Bertrand competition in the final product market, we establish the following three main results.
First, strategic outsourcing occurs in equilibrium if and only if the level of the import tariff on the intermediate product is smaller than mD-mF, the difference between the two firms' costs of producing the intermediate good.
When outsourcing occurs, the domestic firm actually pays more (including the tariff) for the intermediate input than it would cost to produce the good domestically. To understand this counter-intuitive result, one needs to realize that the foreign firm would have less incentive to cut its price in the final good market when it supplies the domestic firm.
This motivates the domestic firm to buy the intermediate input from the foreign firm if the import cost is the same as or slightly higher than the domestic cost of production. Thus, trade liberalization in the intermediate good creates opportunities for multi-market interdependence between competitors in the final product market, resulting in a collusive effect.
Second, in the outsourcing equilibrium a further reduction of import tariffs on the intermediate good would increase what the domestic firm actually pays (including the tariff) for the intermediate input. It is clear that the foreign firm would raise the (producer) price of the intermediate good when the import tariff decreases. But it is surprising that the foreign firm would be able to increase the (producer) price more than proportionately when it has multi-market contact with its rival. This result is important, because it also implies that the prices of the differentiated final products would become higher when trade in the intermediate input is being liberalized. Therefore, in contrast to the common view in the current literature, trade liberalization in intermediate products could have anti-competitive effects on consumer prices.
Third, in the outsourcing equilibrium trade liberalization in the final good would reduce the prices of the final goods but the effect on the price of the intermediate input is not obvious. It would increase (decrease) the price of the intermediate input if the final differentiated products are `weak substitutes' (`strong substitutes'). If the demand function for the final good is linear, then trade liberalization in the final good market has no effect on the price of the intermediate input.
In this paper we have identified a strategic incentive for international outsourcing, which arises from multi-market interactions among firms. It is shown that trade liberalization may create opportunities for multi-market interdependence and cause strategic outsourcing to occur. Unlike the outsourcing decision based on cost saving, strategic outsourcing has anti-competitive effects in the market. In the presence of strategic outsourcing, further trade liberalization in the intermediate product market could produce an anti-competitive effect on the final product market. Therefore, the effects on consumer prices of trade liberalization in general could be ambiguous, depending on the relative degree of trade liberalization in the intermediate and final goods. While the usual cost-saving motive for international outsourcing might be more common, the strategic oursourcing identified in this paper could also be important in some situations. A comprehensive understanding of the effects of trade liberalization and the resulting outsourcing needs to take into account the possible presence of such strategic effects. 
